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Strategic ambiguity and leaders' responsibility beyond maximising profits 
Abstract 
Australia has the world‟s highest number of documented cases of mesothemilia, a lung cancer caused 
by asbestos, and the building products manufacturer, James Hardie (Australia) has been accused for 
causing over half of these cases (Hills, 2005). The Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) sued several executives of James Hardie for misleading stakeholders on asbestos victim 
compensation, and failing to act with care and diligence (ASIC, 2009). In a landmark decision in Australian 
corporate governance, the New South Wales Supreme Court held in April 2009 that James Hardie‟s 
chairwoman, nine directors and executives violated the law by approving and issuing misleading public 
statements about the financial 2 adequacy of a foundation set up to compensate Hardie‟s asbestosis 
victims (John, 2009). Other executives were also held liable for breaching their duty to act with care and 
diligence. The ASIC chairman encouraged corporate boards to carefully consider the court‟s decision, 
and “assess what improvements they can make to their decision making processes, the way they convey 
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THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPER 
Australia has the world‟s highest number of documented cases of mesothemilia, a lung cancer 
caused by asbestos, and the building products manufacturer, James Hardie (Australia) has been 
accused for causing over half of these cases (Hills, 2005). The Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) sued several executives of James Hardie for misleading 
stakeholders on asbestos victim compensation, and failing to act with care and diligence (ASIC, 
2009). In a landmark decision in Australian corporate governance, the New South Wales 
Supreme Court held in April 2009 that James Hardie‟s chairwoman, nine directors and executives 
violated the law by approving and issuing misleading public statements about the financial 
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adequacy of a foundation set up to compensate Hardie‟s asbestosis victims (John, 2009). Other 
executives were also held liable for breaching their duty to act with care and diligence. The ASIC 
chairman encouraged corporate boards to carefully consider the court‟s decision, and “assess 
what improvements they can make to their decision making processes, the way they convey 
decisions to the market and in the way they conduct investor briefings….” (ASIC, 2009). 
The recent financial crisis and corporate scandals have further magnified the importance 
of responsible leadership to build and sustain businesses serving multiple stakeholders (Maak, 
2007; Maak and Pless, 2006). By analyzing the James Hardie asbestos compensation case in 
Australia, we examine the role of strategic ambiguity (SA) on leaders‟ extended responsibility 
beyond profit maximization. SA reflects the deliberate or intentional use of ambiguity or 
vagueness in strategic processes. SA can be used by organizations to typically emphasize an 
interpretation where the executive and organizational behavior is viewed more favorably (Ulmer 
and Sellnow, 1997). The paper reveals how James Hardie leaders, against mounting community 
and stakeholder pressure, took cover behind their purported primary obligation of maximizing 
shareholder returns through a campaign that was strategically ambiguous. While Hardie leaders 
engaged in minimum social responsibility standards, the use of strategic ambiguity appears to 
have helped the company to avoid engaging in virtuous action extending beyond maximizing 
profits.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Using Våland and Heide‟s (2005) regulators of organizational crisis, Ulmer and Sellnow‟s (1997, 
2000) ethic of significant choice, and Bright, Cameron and Caza‟s (2006) organizational 
virtuousness, we propose a Strategic Virtuousness Model as a framework for analyzing leader 
and organizational responsibility in SA associated corporate action.  
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Regulators of organizational crisis 
The response to an organizational crisis can be determined by several factors. According to 
Våland and Heide (2005), the response to a crisis passes through three “regulators”, which 
influence the significance of the episode. We extend their model and present the Strategic 
Virtuousness model as illustrated in Figure 1.  
Drivers lead to increased emphasis on the crisis, increased awareness among stakeholders, 
and public media interest. More integration/higher interdependencies between companies are 
some examples (Våland and Heide, 2005). Internal Tools refer to the firm‟s own rules, processes 
and structures that safeguard a “responsible” company. Measurements, auditing and reporting are 
tools to strengthen internal efforts to comply with the company‟s policies and thereby build trust 
with external stakeholders. 
 
Figure 1: The Strategic Virtuousness Model 
 
The strength of the internal tools is also influenced by organizational consistency. Enablers are 

































for corporate performance. Våland and Heide (2005) point out that the effectiveness of the 
enablers is also influenced by the level of consistency. 
 Thus the drivers, internal tools and enablers constitute regulators, which may reduce or 
amplify the effects of the company‟s response to a crisis. In some situations, the impact of the 
event may nearly diminish because public media show no interest in the episode or the company 
has the necessary tools to defuse the situation. In other circumstances, the incident may cause a 
significant uproar because it is illegal or in conflict with internal rules of conduct and ends up as 
headline news (Våland and Heide, 2005). In these instances, SA is used by organizations to 
manage stakeholder perceptions of organizational and leader responsibility. 
The ethic of significant choice 
In general, SA can be employed in four roles (Eisenberg, 2007; Eisenberg and Goodall, 1977). 
First, the use of SA allows for diversity of views or interpretations, and promotes inclusiveness 
and unity in its diversity. Second, SA can be used to preserve privileged positions by shielding 
individuals from scrutiny or the revelation of sensitive or confidential details, while providing a 
general overview or picture. Third, is its deniability. Vagueness in communication has the 
potential and flexibility to develop future options by testing reactions to new ideas and 
minimizing conflicts. Finally, SA facilitates organizational change by allowing interpretive room 
for leaders to change behavior and course of action for the future. 
By employing SA, leaders have opportunity to emphasize an interpretation where the 
organization is viewed most favorably, and minimize the importance of ethics (Eisenberg and 
Goodall, 1997). The deniability attribute of SA can be used by leaders to avoid blame and 
responsibility or to preserve those who misuse their position and power. However, Paul and 
Strbiak (1997) contend that “strategic ambiguity itself does not minimize the importance of 
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ethics. Rather, intentional unethical use and the naivete of communicators serve to minimize the 
ethical use of strategic ambiguity in organizations” (p.156). SA can be, therefore, utilized both in 
an ethical or unethical manner. Its application depends on the ethical sensitivity of the individual 
utilizing it.  
Based on the framework offered by Ulmer and Sellnow (1997, 2000), at the individual 
level, the ethicality of the leaders‟ use of SA can be determined according to three criteria. The 
first criterion is the questions of evidence. The nature and complexity of any material evidence, 
including their interpretations, often complicated by the use of rhetoric or metaphors, can be 
examined for its reasonableness, bias and equity of impact on relevant stakeholders. The 
questions of intent are often critical in determining whether any action is ethical or not. Applying 
SA with an intent to misinterpret, mislead and deceive raises issues of social legitimacy (Seeger, 
1986), honourable intention and truth. The final criterion is the questions of locus of 
responsibility. Determining responsibility in a crisis for any organization can be ambiguous and 
difficult. Taking advantage of this to shift the cause and blame to other parties or stakeholders 
poses ethical issues. In this context, organizational virtuousness can be employed to determine 
the consequences of organizational action in crisis situations. 
Organizational virtuousness 
Virtuousness is the “pursuit of the highest aspirations in the human condition. It is characterized 
by human impact, moral goodness, and unconditional societal betterment” (Bright et al., 2006, 
p.249). Human impact is the effect firm activities have on improving the living conditions, well-
being and the resilience of beneficiaries. The moral goodness is based on the conception of 
“character traits in people and organizations that are seen as desirable” (Bright, 2006, p.753). The 
last attribute, unconditional societal benefit is the “intention to create goods of first intent and to 
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prudently use goods of second intent to instrumentally bring benefit to society” (ibid). 
Organizations demonstrating this attribute would initiate activities because it is the “right thing to 
do”.  
APPROACH 
Using available secondary data on the James Hardie asbestos case in Australia, a single case 
study was developed to examine the role of SA in CSR and leaders‟ ethical decision making. The 
sources of data include media reports, James Hardie media releases and other publicly available 
documents such as inquiry reports.  
CASE APPLICATION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
In 2001, James Hardie announced that it has been sued by 2,000 people injured or killed by its 
asbestos products (James Hardie Industries Limited, 2001). The Medical Research and 
Compensation Foundation (MRCF) with assets of $293 million was launched to settle all future 
claims. In 2003, the company announced that the MRCF was underfunded (Hills, 2001; 2005). In 
April 2009, an Australian court held that the board directors knowingly misled its stakeholders 
when a media release said a new asbestos compensation trust was “fully funded” and “provided 
certainty” for asbestos disease claimants (John, 2009). In addition, they were held liable for 
breaching their duty to act with care and diligence.  
Intense media scrutiny on James Hardie has been a major driver that has led to an 
increased emphasis on the crisis and increased awareness among stakeholders (Figure 1). Due to 
the action taken by Hardie victims, increased demands for transparency and growing expectations 
on victim compensation has affected almost every sphere of activity of the company (Mahar, 
2009). Growing public media interest reinforced stakeholder awareness. More integration and 
higher interdependencies between these stakeholders, especially the State, Federal and corporate 
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watch dogs such as ASIC have held Hardie accountable for the practices of their business 
partners throughout the value chain. 
 Internal Tools refer to the firm‟s own rules, processes and structures that safeguard a 
“responsible” company and its employees. Measurements, auditing and reporting are tools to 
strengthen internal efforts to comply with the company‟s policies and thereby build trust with 
external stakeholders. The strength of the internal tools is also influenced by organizational 
consistency. Thus when Hardie employees handle, interpret and understand the victim 
compensation saga very differently from other stakeholders such as the public and the Supreme 
Court, organizational consistency is low. With low consistency, the significance and the 
influencing power of internal tools are reduced.   
 Enablers are generally designed to support, measure, and assist in implementation and 
enhance accountability for corporate performance. It can be argued that whilst knowing the 
dangers of asbestos dust as far back as 1898, James Hardie continued to manufacture asbestos 
products until 1986, showing little regard for safety standards and duty of care especially towards 
employees and customers. Law, provisions and court decisions, entail rules against manipulation 
of competition and laws with the aim of improving the ethicality of executive action. Hardie 
continuing to manufacture asbestos until 1986 despite the first James Hardie death occurring in 
1966 and its partner, CSR being forced to close down in 1966, shows a lack of duty of care. 
 In sum, the regulators consisting of the drivers, internal tools and enablers impacted 
adversely on the executives‟ and company‟s response to the asbestos crisis. With intense media 
coverage, the incident caused a significant uproar in Australia. In response, the company adopted 
a strategically ambiguous campaign to paint a positive picture on the issue. For example, in 2001, 
the Hardie CEO claimed that with starting assets of $293 million, the establishment of a fund to 
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pay asbestos victims provides certainty for people with a legitimate claim against the company, 
and that this establishment has effectively resolved Hardie‟s asbestos liability. However, only 
after 2 years of making this claim, the $293 million allocation was proved to be grossly 
inadequate. A 2004 estimate of the compensation liability was $2.24 billion. 
 Moving onto the ethic of significant choice, questions of evidence in the James Hardie 
case are centered over the legal debates which occurred in the aftermath of the crisis. According 
to Ulmer and Sellnow (1997), these altercations usually pit the organisation‟s team of experts 
against those from legal or governmental agencies. For example, the legal debate that continued 
with the James Hardie case on the companies‟ ability to hide behind the corporate veil (Merritt et 
al, 2004).  
 Questions of intent emerge when the organization‟s social legitimacy is questioned. In 
other words, if the organization cannot prove that it intended to produce reliable products and 
services in a safe manner, it will likely lose whatever public support it once enjoyed. In the 
Hardie case, the company lost the public confidence due to continuing to manufacture a harmful 
product. With media reports and expert comments pouring out under headings such as “James 
Hardie: No Soul to be Damned and No Body to Be Kicked” (Dunn, 2005) and “A Billion-dollar 
Case of Poor Judgement” (Sexton, 2004), the Hardie executives continued with the usual rhetoric 
of painting a positive image on the crisis, often, further damaging its social legitimacy. Merely 
six months before the declaration of the compensation deal, Hardie was insisting it had no 
intention to pay, that the directors‟ primary obligations to their shareholders to generate profits 
prevented them from doing so, suggesting wilful disregard of public welfare by James Hardie.  
 Based on the application of Ulmer and Sellnow‟s (2000) ethic of significant choice 
model, there is sufficient evidence, intent and locus to hold Hardie leaders responsible for the 
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crisis. However, at the organizational level, the Jackson (Queen‟s Counsel) inquiry found that the 
company had no legal obligation to pay compensation to its victims (Sexton, 2004). Despite these 
inadequate outcomes on organizational responsibility as per Australian corporate law, ethically, 
at an organizational level, organizational virtuousness can be used to assess the virtuousness in 
the James Hardie case.  
In a crisis such as of the asbestos victims of James Hardie, which resulted in loss of life 
and livelihood and deterioration of wellbeing, the first attribute of organizational virtuousness, 
the place of human impact is relatively easier to assess. With James Hardie chairwoman‟s own 
admission and apology (The Age, 2004), there is little doubt that the asbestos operations of James 
Hardie had a significant adverse impact on its victims. Considering the role of the second 
attribute of organisational virtuousness, the moral goodness of James Hardie responses to the 
crisis, the key question is whether the company did “the right thing”. Although no victim of 
James Hardie has gone without compensation yet (Sexton, 2004), questions of evidence, intent 
and locus show that the company was managed at the minimum level of corporate social 
responsibility, meeting only its required legal obligations. At no time the company went beyond 
its legal duty to engage in doing “the right thing” by the victims. One example is of the 
misleading release of public information on the compensation funding. The Supreme Court found 
that Hardie‟s chairwoman between 2004 and 2007 and nine directors and executives violated the 
law by “approving and issuing misleading public statements about the financial adequacy of the 
Foundation set up to compensate asbestosis victims” (John, 2009). The final attribute of 
organisational virtuousness is unconditionality of social benefits, which according to Bright 
(2006) is the “intention to create goods of first intent and to prudently use goods of second intent 
to instrumentally bring benefit to society” (p.753). Several examples illustrate that Hardie leaders 
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were not interested in goods of first intent (a virtuous pursuit), but attempted to protect goods of 
second intent (company reputation) from any harm.  
CONTRIBUTIONS 
The recent financial crisis and other corporate scandals indicate that it takes responsible 
leadership and responsible leaders to build and sustain a business that is beneficial to multiple 
stakeholders (Maak, 2007, p. 329; Maak and Pless, 2006). On the contrary, in this exploratory 
application of the strategic virtuousness framework to the James Hardie asbestos compensation 
scandal, the findings suggest the leaders‟ irresponsible use of SA to typically emphasize a 
favorable interpretation of the company‟s operations at the expense of asbestos victims. Evidence 
show how, in the pursuit of maximizing profits, Hardie leaders ignored basic tenets of human 
decency and caring towards its asbestos victims. However, this case can be identified as one of 
the more extreme cases to examine the use of SA by business leaders. The application of the 
proposed strategic virtuousness model in less-extreme cases could reveal interesting and subtle 
tensions between variables such as questions of intent and moral goodness. Future researchers 
could examine the application of the model on a larger sample of business leaders drawn from 
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